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Abstract 
This thesis examines the foundations for success in peacekeeping operations. To this 
end, the absence or presence of two preconditions, commitment, and credibility, which 
are essential for the fulfillment of the assigned mandate are explored on a cross-case-
study comparison between UNMISS and MONUSCO. Indicator questions yield 
information on the extent to which each operation encompasses the investigated 
preconditions. The findings of the analysis indicate that UNMISS has low commitment 
and low credibility, and MONUSCO has high commitment and rather high credibility. 
Based on the absence of the preconditions in UNMISS, this thesis argues that the 
operation lacks a strong foundation for the effective fulfillment of its mandate, and thus 
has negative prospects for success, while MONSUCO, due to the presence of credibility 
and commitment has rather positive prospects for a successful implementation of its 
mandate.  
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1. Introduction 
To date, peacekeeping operations deployed by the United Nations (UN) continue to fall 
short on the fulfillment of their mandate for the ‘Protection of Civilians’ (POC). The UN 
came into existence in the wake of two atrocious World Wars with the fundamental 
aspiration to “maintain international peace and security” (UN 1945: n.p.). One of its tools 
to comply with this ambition is the deployment of peacekeeping operations in regions 
torn by conflict and war. Initially, peacekeeping operations were assigned to supervise 
the cessation of inter-state wars, which were the most common form of conflict in the 
past century, and to guarantee the compliance with peace treaties. Since the end of the 
Cold War in the 1990s, however, the world has become a stage to a growing number of 
intra-state conflicts, which are repeatedly characterized by the deliberate victimization 
of civilians (Kaldor 2013: 1).  
Recognizing the need for transformation, UN peacekeeping operations have reformed 
to comply with new demands and to react to challenges contemporary wars pose. The 
turn of the millennium marked growing acknowledgment of humanitarian needs in 
conflict situations, which gave rise for civilian protection to become a primary focus of 
modern-day peacekeeping operations (Nadin et al. 2014: 47). After the first operations 
had been assigned with a focus on civilian protection in the early 2000s, an increasing 
number of operations were specifically mandated with POC as their main responsibility. 
Simultaneously, peacekeepers were assigned with a growing complexity of tasks, which 
has not throughout resulted in successful outcomes. Mismatches between the complex 
mandates and limited resources often led to setbacks (Bellamy et al. 2010: 19). Since then, 
peacekeeping operations have been granted significantly higher budgets and troop 
strength. At first glance, it appears that these changes resulted in peacekeeping 
operations being better prepared to face challenges in the field. Nonetheless, they are 
frequently reported to fail in fulfilling their mandate and being unable to comply with 
their responsibility to protect civilians.  
In an effort to understand success and failure in peacekeeping operations from a 
different perspective than to assume that capacities alone determine success, this thesis 
explores further preconditions that are considered essential for the successful fulfillment 
of peacekeeping responsibilities. The analysis focuses on the investigation of two case 
studies, which are the operation UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South Sudan) and 
 
 
6 
MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo). Consequently, this research will investigate the question: “To 
what extent are the necessary preconditions for the successful implementation of the 
mandate for the ‘Protection of Civilians’ present in the peacekeeping operations 
UNMISS in South Sudan, and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?”. 
The purpose of this thesis is to create and enhance the understanding of preconditions, 
essential for the success of peacekeeping operations, thereby shedding light on ways to 
improve present and future operations. Looking beyond the thoroughly discussed 
impact of low and high capabilities on the outcome of peacekeeping operations, this 
thesis is going to explore two related, yet less frequently analyzed preconditions, which 
are ‘credibility’ and ‘commitment’. Increasing awareness of the preconditions that 
impact the efficiency of peacekeeping is vital, because improving the performance of 
peacekeepers and their ability to protect civilians is essential not only for the UN, whose 
legitimacy as a global actor is closely linked to its ability to protect civilians, but also for 
the pursuit of worldwide peace and security. 
Based on the reports of rising numbers of reported civilian fatalities in South Sudan since 
the deployment of UNMISS (ACLED A 2017: n.p.), and the declining number civilian 
fatalities in the Congo (DRC) since the deployment of MONSUCO (ACLED B 2017: n.p.), 
the hypotheses underlying the research question are: 
× H1: The peacekeeping operation UNMISS does not have the necessary 
preconditions to fulfill its mandate for the Protection of Civilians. 
× H2: The peacekeeping operation MONUSCO does have the necessary 
preconditions to fulfill its mandate for the Protection of Civilians. 
The hypotheses will be tested through the investigation of the presence of the two 
selected preconditions, in the operations UNMISS and MONUSCO, chosen for the 
cross-case-study comparison of two most similar cases.  
The thesis is structured as follows. The subsequent Chapter 2 firstly provides 
background information on peacekeeping operations and the POC mandate, to better 
understand the research findings and their significance. Thereafter, success and failure 
in peacekeeping operations are discussed, shedding light on preconditions impacting 
the efficiency of peacekeeping operations and possibilities for assessment. Chapter 3 
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presents a detailed description of the approach and methodology of this thesis. 
Chapter 4 comprises the analysis of the two case studies UNMISS and MONUSCO. The 
analysis applies a model, adapted from Diehl and Druckman’s Evaluation Framework 
(2010), to yield information on manifestations of credibility and commitment in the 
military realm, which aims to protect civilians from physical violence, of both 
operations. Secondarily, also the status quo of the humanitarian realm is explored to 
provide a more comprehensive understanding. The research to this end consists 
predominantly of qualitative research, which is the most suitable approach, as will be 
discussed below. Thereafter, Chapter 5 summarizes and discusses the main results of the 
analysis, and explains their significance and implications. Finally, Chapter 6 lays out the 
conclusion to the central research question, determines whether the hypotheses have 
been confirmed, and presents a look ahead at remaining opportunities and challenges 
in future studies. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Peacekeeping 
To comply with its ambition of creating and maintaining global peace and security, the 
UN deploys peacekeeping operations to support regions torn by war, to mediate ongoing 
conflicts, and to rebuild the social and political environment for peace to re-flourish. 
The signing of the UN Charter in 1945 preceded the establishment of the first 
peacekeeping operation and therefore lacks an official classification of what peace 
operations are and which purposes they serve. In the past decades, due to this lack of 
clarity on a concrete definition of peacekeeping, scholars came to conceptualize 
peacekeeping in various ways, resulting in a diversity of definitions from which no 
unified understanding of responsibilities and realms could emerge. According to Diehl, 
peacekeeping is “the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of 
hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party 
intervention organized and directed internationally, using a multinational force of 
soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace” (Diehl 1988: 487). The US 
Army General Quinn, on the other hand, conceptualized peacekeeping as “non-combat 
military operations (exclusive of self-defense) conducted by UN authorized forces with 
the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate an existing 
truce agreement” (Quinn 1994: 20).  
Most scholars agree on the basic notion that peacekeeping refers to third-party activities 
aimed at creating and maintaining conditions for lasting peace in countries or territories 
shaken by conflict. Yet, beyond that, there is little consensus in the academic literature 
on what exactly peacekeeping means, let alone what it entails (Diehl and Druckman 
2010: 2).  
  
Development of peacekeeping in the 20th century 
The era following the end of the First World War initiated growing institutionalization 
of international cooperation, firstly through the founding of the League of Nations 
(1920), and then in the aftermath of the Second World War through the establishment 
of the UN (1945). In 1948, the UN actively assumed responsibility for international peace 
through the formation of its first peacekeeping-like operation, which sent observers to 
 
 
9 
the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its neighbors. 
In 1956, the first mission officially referred to as a ‘peacekeeping operation’ was deployed 
to mediate the Suez Crisis. The first operations deployed by the UN were primarily 
tasked with the resolution of inter-state wars, which were the prevailing form of dispute 
in the 20th century. The responsibilities of peacekeepers at the time included the 
observation and monitoring of the implementation of peace agreements, and were thus 
largely unarmed and not equipped for active fighting (Nadin et al. 2014: 38).  
Peacekeeping operations deployed during the Cold War (1947-1991) subscribed to three 
basic principles, laid out by Hammarskjöld, former UN General-Secretary (1953-1961). 
These principles, guiding the work of peacekeepers, were: (1) the consent of the parties 
involved, (2) impartiality, and (3) non-use of force, only in cases of self-defense, and 
defense of the mandate (Howard 2008: 13). Peacekeeping operations up until the end of 
the Cold War are known as traditional, or ‘first-generation’ peacekeeping operations. 
Since their establishment, UN peacekeeping operations have changed significantly and 
evolved to meet the demands of the changing nature of conflict and the political 
landscape. 
The literature discusses the end of the Cold War, accompanied by global social and 
political changes, as a major turning point for the conduct of peacekeeping operations. 
Three particularly influential changes for peacekeeping operations were the emergence 
of modern worldwide communication, the rising number of intra-state wars, and the 
“triumph of liberalism” (Bellamy et al. 2010: 95). Firstly, accelerated globalization, which 
began to speed up with the introduction of new technologies and the World Wide Web, 
enabling the quick spread of information, incited a number of challenges to 
peacekeeping operations (ibid.). With the advance of media, people were increasingly 
aware of happenings in distant parts of the world. This meant that people became better 
informed of atrocities taking place, leading to greater public demand for peacekeeping, 
which put the UN under pressure to respond and caused the number of deployed 
operations to increase significantly since the 1990s. Secondly, modern globalization gave 
rise to changes in prevailing warfare practices, which posed new challenges for 
peacekeeping operations. Some scholars postulate that the end of the Cold War incited 
a ‘new world disorder’, characterized by new forms of ethnic, commonly intra-state 
conflicts, and ‘roguish behaviors’ (Bellamy et al. 2010: 94). Moreover, conflicts in the 
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post-Cold-War era are characterized by their deliberate and strategic targeting of non-
combats as a method of warfare (Kaldor 2013: 1). This, arguably new, strategy of war 
required respectively new approaches to conflict-solution, because civilians have 
increasingly become victim of contemporary warfare. Finally, with the end of the Cold 
War, liberalism had prevailed over communism as the dominant ideology, and with it 
the promotion of Human Rights and democratization, encouraging the UN to “believe 
that peace operations could help transform war-torn societies by protecting human 
rights, fostering democracy and enforcing peace” (Bellamy et al. 2010: 119).  
These social and political changes faced the UN with new opportunities, but also novel 
demands and challenges. New media enabled the world population to witness the 
consequences of the new forms of warfare, which made civilians deliberate target, 
leading to a greater public demand for humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping 
operations. In combination with the liberally growing political norms, the UN was faced 
with the need to transform its conduct of peacekeeping operations to meet the demands 
of the time and to maintain its legitimacy as peacekeepers. As a result, UN peacekeeping 
operations underwent a ‘Triple Transformation’ (ibid.: 93). This reconstruction (1988-
1993) transformed peacekeeping operations on a qualitative, normative, and 
quantitative level. Operations became more complex, bigger, and more frequent (ibid.). 
A side effect of the growing complexity was the blurring lines between previously 
distinct realms of peacekeeping operations. For example, peace-building and peace-
enforcing activities, which had been different activities, became closely interwoven with 
the regular responsibilities of peacekeepers. This (triple) transformation, characterizes 
the emergence of a ‘second-generation’, also known as multidimensional peacekeeping 
operations, due to the variety of responsibilities and dimensions tasked with. ‘Second-
generation’ peacekeepers were not just assigned with passive supervision and 
monitoring, but trusted with a “wide range of unprecedented activities” (Uesugi 2004: 
100), such as humanitarian assistance and aid, helping political processes, by supporting 
elections and nurturing transitional justice (Bowden 2006: 67).  
Not long after their emergence, ‘second-generation’ peacekeeping operations were 
floundering already. In the mid-1990s peacekeeping operations faced severe criticism 
due to the failure to prevent atrocities such as the genocides in Rwanda (1994) and 
Srebrenica (1995), as well as failed operations in Angola (UNAVEM I and II), and Somalia 
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(UNOSOM II) (Bellamy et al. 2010: 119). Those failures were mostly due to “gradual 
expansion of peace operations without a requisite growth in the UN's institutional 
capacity” (ibid.). On paper, peacekeeping operations were expanding, both in 
responsibilities and capacities. Implementation on the field, however, was not able to 
keep up with theoretical advancements. That led to operations, which were deployed 
“without appropriate mandates, information, political support, troops, resources and 
guidance and these shortcomings were swiftly and brutally exposed” (ibid.). Such 
failures plunged peacekeeping into a crisis and promoted rethinking and re-evaluation 
of peacekeeping operations and their strategies. The multidimensional aspects of 
‘second-generation’ peacekeeping operations were questioned, voices called for the 
retreat to traditional supervision and monitoring, and the UNSC became reluctant to 
deploy new operations (ibid.: 93). In order to investigate a possible future for 
peacekeeping operations and to identify problems that had led to the failures of the mid-
1990s, Annan, UN General Secretary at the time, called to ‘think anew’ about the UN’s 
responses to humanitarian atrocities worldwide in 1999 (SG/SM/7136 1999: n.p.).  
Thereupon, a number of reports and investigations were filed, which examined the 
manner in which the UN “mandated, organized, and conducted its peace operations and 
exposed gaps between the tasks peacekeepers were expected to fulfill in the post-Cold 
War era and the conceptual and material resources made available to them” (Bellamy 
et al. 2010: 93). Particularly influential in the rethinking of peacekeeping operations was 
the Brahimi Report published in 2000 (A/55/305 2000). The report recognized that 
previously false assumptions about the situation on the field had been made and that 
operations were inadequately equipped for their tasks. The main topics addressed were 
the suitable mandating and respective capacities, encouraging rapid and effective 
deployment, as well as the fact that the protection of civilians must become a priority of 
UN peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the report discussed a new and active 
impartiality, which enabled peacekeepers to act more forcefully to protect themselves, 
the mandate, and civilians in particular (ibid.).  
Thereafter, a new ‘third-generation’ of peacekeeping operations emerged, which was 
characterized by its assertive, greater capabilities and robust mandates, allowing for the 
use of ‘all necessary means’ to enforce the mandate. Moreover, new technologies, and 
novel approaches towards associating with the local populations, especially in regards 
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to the protection of civilians, evolved, which will be discussed in the following chapter 
(Karlsrud 2015: 43).  
 
2.2. Protection of Civilians 
Following the number of civilians who fell victim to violent conflicts in the 1990s, some 
accounting to genocide, and the failure of the international community to find an 
appropriate response to prevent the occurring atrocities, a re-thinking of the role of UN 
peacekeeping in the mitigation and prevention of violence targeted at civilians was 
prompted. This reform process gave rise to considerations of what is now known as the 
‘Protection of Civilians’ (POC). In the late 1990s, POC has emerged to become a 
dimension of peacekeeping operations, as well as a commitment of the UN to protect 
non-combats from harm. In its most basic form, POC incorporates the responsibility to 
protect civilians from physical violence, as well as deprivation, hunger, and human rights 
abuses. Such efforts take place both through active safeguarding of the local population 
and through support for local communities to take measures in order to protect 
themselves (Bellamy et al. 2010: 344). 
While the fundamental objective of POC is evident, there is “no consensus about what 
protection entails, how civilians are best protected, or who is primarily responsible for 
protection” (ibid.: 358). This ambiguity undermines the effective implementation of 
POC in the field because it does not allow for a unified understanding and approach in 
endeavors aimed at civilian protection (Willmot and Sheeran 2013: 518). The following 
section seeks to provide a better understanding of POC, by clarifying how it has 
developed to its present form, and what it entails as a dimension and mandate of UN 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
Development of POC as a concept 
The underlying idea of protecting non-combats from victimization in war emerges from 
the perennial human conviction that there should be some constraint and benevolence 
in armed conflicts (Willmot et al. 2016: 11). Neither the idea that civilians ought to be 
protected in warfare is new, nor are legal frameworks and agreements set up to ensure 
civilian protection. For example, the Geneva Conventions laid down standards of 
 
 
13 
international law for the humanitarian behavior in war. Yet, atrocities in the 1990s 
revealed once again that the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and complementary 
legal frameworks alone are not sufficient to ensure the protection of civilians, more 
pragmatic approaches to safeguard civilians are needed (de Carvalho and Sending 2012: 
18). The failure to halt the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica constituted a grave crisis 
for UN peacekeeping operations. These genocides that took place under the watch of 
UN peacekeepers heavily damaged their reputation and credibility. This led to the 
understanding that the legitimacy of the UN’s role in peace activities depends on their 
ability to successfully engage in the safeguarding of local populations. Further, the 
massacres revealed that not only the prevailing peacekeeping operations were 
insufficiently equipped in terms of capacities to fulfill their mandate, but also disclosed 
that new commitments for the protection of civilians were needed. Thereupon, in 1999, 
Annan, called for the re-thinking of how the UN responds to armed conflict and the role 
of peacekeeping operations in the business of the protection of civilians (Curran 2016: 
1). Following this call, a number of reports and investigations were filed in the late 1990s, 
giving rise to greater consideration of humanitarianism in the ‘second-generation’ of 
peacekeeping operations and the authorization of mandates, which took up the POC as 
their main priority.  
In the same year, POC appeared for the first time as a distinct conceptual realm of 
peacekeeping operations in a report by Annan (S/1999/957). The report concluded that 
civilian protection in conflict situations is a humanitarian imperative (S/1999/957 1999: 
15) and marked the first step towards the development of POC as an integral component 
of peacekeeping operations. The following years produced a number of resolutions, 
refining and the concept as a growing priority. Most noticeable are UNSC Resolutions 
1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000), which outlined a set of basic responsibilities that were to 
become the core responsibilities of POC today, namely: to “(i) ensure safety of civilians, 
(ii) ensure compliance with IHL, (iii) address impunity and injustice, (iv) ensure the 
unimpeded access and safety of humanitarian personnel, and (v) address the 
proliferation of small arms and the problems caused by conventional armaments” 
(de Carvalho and Sending 2012: 20). 
While the development of POC as an executable concept was still ongoing, in September 
1999, the first peacekeeping operation to receive the specific mandate for POC was 
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deployed in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). For the first time, peacekeepers were specifically 
instructed to protect the local population, and equipped with the means to “take the 
necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and 
{…} to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” 
(S/1999/1069 1999: 3). The mission was largely considered a success in its efforts to fulfill 
their mandate for POC (UN 2003: n.p.). 
A year later, in 2000, the report requested by Annan was published and became known 
as the ‘Brahimi Report’ insisting that UN peacekeepers must engage in the active efforts 
to protect civilians. The report further implied that POC should be a “‘presumed’ 
mandate for all UN missions” (Bellamy et al. 2010: 337). Moreover, the report noted that 
to fulfill this mandate, peacekeepers must be granted the right and means to defend 
civilians, themselves, and their mandate. Before, peacekeeping was strictly guided by 
‘impartiality’, which hampered the assertive use of force to protect civilians. The 
transformation to robust, ‘third-generation’ peacekeeping operations and the ‘Brahimi 
Report’ contributed to enabling the use of more forceful measures to protect civilians 
from violence and deprivation (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 133). The report was the 
first step of a number of investigations aiming to improve the effectiveness of the 
implementation of POC in peacekeeping operations. Since its introduction, POC has 
continuously developed corresponding to lessons learned from successes and setbacks. 
Numerous resolutions and reports followed the initial documents, affirming the 
commitment of the international community and the UN to engage in the POC through 
forceful means to ensure civilian protection in areas of deployment. Closely related to 
the ideas underlying POC, is the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty Report “Responsibility to Protect”, which was published in 2001, and 
adopted by the Heads of State Summit in 2005. It laid out that whenever a state is unable 
or unwilling to protect its population, the international community assumes the 
responsibility to protect the affected civilians (ICISS 2001: 74). The Capstone Doctrine 
was published in 2008, ten years after the first documents mentioning POC, 
emphasizing that POC is not a responsibility of humanitarian agencies alone but an 
integral part of military, police and civilian agents in the field. It further stressed the 
need for close coordination between these actors. The doctrine serves to guide 
peacekeepers in the fulfillment of their POC mandate (UN 2008).  
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Since its introduction, POC has established itself as an integral part of most 
peacekeeping operations deployed today. According to Curran, to date, the UNSC has 
authorized 13 mandates that incorporate tasks relating to POC, implying that 95% of the 
deployed peacekeepers work under a mandate, containing a POC dimension (Curran 
2016: 6).  
The implementation of the POC mandate today is complex in nature, due to the variety 
of inter-related tasks, and the diversity of actors involved in their execution. For a better 
understanding of this complex concept, Bellamy et al. classify POC into three 
dimensions. All three are distinct but complementary realms of POC activities (Bellamy 
et al. 2010: 344). Firstly, there is the realm ‘Protection of Rights’, in which, efforts are 
mainly concerned with the protection of and adherence to the rights of the individual 
in accordance with the IHL. Such efforts include the creation of an environment that 
allows individuals to claim the rights owned to them through the IHL and International 
Human Rights (ibid.). This dimension establishes a minimum treatment of civilians in 
war. Secondly, ‘Humanitarian Protection’, in the following referred to as ‘humanitarian 
realm’, is devoted to ensuring that basic needs for survival are met. That includes i.a. the 
provision of medicine, shelter, and food (ibid.). This dimension relates more directly to 
the physical integrity of civilians; its principal concern is to keep people safe. 
Humanitarian agencies, however, are rarely capable of physically protecting civilians 
from imminent danger. Thus, the last dimension serves as the complementary final 
piece to ensure comprehensive protection. Finally, ‘Military Protection’, in the following 
referred to as ‘military realm’, is concerned with the prevention and limitation of 
physical violence against the civilian population, as well as securing humanitarian access 
(ibid.).  
The three categories further give insight into the great variety of actors involved in 
ensuring the implementation of POC. Regrettably, despite the abundance of legal 
frameworks, commitments, resolutions aimed at civilian protection, and almost 20 years 
after the introduction of POC, civilians continue to be victimized, even in the presence 
of peacekeeping forces. A number of internal and external conditions affect the 
successful implementation of the POC mandate. The following chapter is going to 
address preconditions impacting the success and failure of POC and the peacekeeping 
operation as a whole.  
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2.3. Achieving and assessing success and failure in UN peacekeeping 
operations 
Understanding when an operation has succeeded, what factors and preconditions have 
contributed to that outcome, and finding adequate benchmarks to assess the oftentimes 
ambivalent nature of peacekeeping efforts are imperative components of the profound 
analysis of peacekeeping operations. Improving the understanding of preconditions that 
lead to failure is another prerequisite for finding and guiding appropriate policy 
decisions, and opening doors for innovation and improvement. 
 
Success and failure in peacekeeping operations 
The difficulties of determining what constitutes success and failure in peace operations 
gave rise to a variety of conceptualizations. Scholars throughout the academic field have 
differing ideas of what to regard as success and failure, and varying approaches to 
evaluating the outcome of peacekeeping operations. Thus, the literature offers no 
consensus regarding the success or failure of an operation, and the assessment of the 
impact of peacekeeping efforts. The review of the literature revealed three 
commonalities found in most definitions of success and failure.  
Firstly, ‘negative peace’, limiting or creating the absence of violence, is mentioned as a 
minimum standard in almost all conceptualizations of what constitutes success in a 
peacekeeping operation (Pushkina 2006: 145). Secondly, the ‘completion of the mandate’ 
frequently appears as another indicator that a peacekeeping operation was successful 
(Bratt 1997: 46). This benchmark, however, does not always lend itself to direct 
evaluation. That is because mandates are often written in an ambiguous language, and 
concrete goals are not always clear, and thus challenging to measure. Therefore, 
indicators need to be found, which give an appropriate representation of when the 
mandate can be regarded as fulfilled. Finally, a third common standard for success in 
peacekeeping operations is the creation of ‘positive peace’. Some scholars, such as Paris 
(2004), go as far to claim that peacekeeping operations must only be evaluated based on 
the successful creation of lasting peace (Paris 2004: 3). Ideally, all peacekeeping 
operations should aim to establish positive peace. Due to the often deeply rooted sources 
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of conflict, this standard, however, is unachievable in certain situations that 
peacekeepers are entrusted with. 
If mandated with POC, a peacekeeping operation can only be successful if it fulfills its 
POC mandate and relating responsibilities. Benchmarks of success in fulfilling the 
mandate for POC are just as broadly defined by the academic literature as the standards 
of success and failure in peacekeeping operations as a whole. Primarily, a POC mandate 
can be considered as fulfilled, if peacekeepers were able to protect a large share of the 
population from violence and deprivation. A particular focus often lays on the protection 
of the most vulnerable groups of the population, such as women, children, disabled and 
internally displaced people (IDP). Another benchmark of success or failure is the 
creation of an environment in which civilians are free from violence and deprivation, 
which further educates the civilians to protect themselves after the retreat of the 
peacekeeping forces. Such responsibilities might include related activities, such as the 
securitization of aid convoys and humanitarian aid deliveries into dangerous territory. 
 
What preconditions are necessary for a peacekeeping operation to succeed? 
The UN, as well as scholars in the field, have identified a number of factors and 
conditions that influence the prospects for success of a peacekeeping operation and its 
POC mandate. In the Capstone Doctrine, the UN concludes that adhering to the three 
fundamental principles of peacekeeping, which are ‘consent of the involved parties’, 
‘impartiality’, and ‘non-use of force’, is essential for achieving success (UN 2008: 52). 
Besides, the Capstone Doctrine mentions ‘credibility’ as one of the most significant 
assets in peacekeeping operations. Credibility is a direct reflection of the local and 
international communities’ faith in the operation’s capability to fulfill its mandate (ibid.: 
38). In order to strengthen the credibility, peacekeeping operations must have a clear 
and actionable mandate, which reflects a thorough understanding of the local situation. 
Moreover, the operation must be equipped with matching capabilities and resources to 
achieve its ambitions (Hultman et al. 2014: 875). The (political) support received from 
the UNSC also impacts the operation’s credibility. Both, adequate capabilities and 
(political) support can be pooled under the term commitment. Hultman et al. identify 
that the level of commitment is directly correlated to the ability to protect civilians and 
is therefore essential for both, the overall success to fulfill the mandate and the 
 
 
18 
credibility of a peacekeeping operation (ibid.: 876). That is because the faith in the 
ability of peacekeepers is in danger of eroding if the behavior of peacekeepers leads to 
resentment in the local population, either through misconduct, or a perceived inability 
to stabilize the local situation (UN 2008: 37). Similarly, credibility suffers when an 
operation is not perceived as adequately supported or equipped to be able to fulfill its 
mandate and face the conflict situation. Thus, effectiveness and the ability to manage 
the expectations regarding the operation’s ability impact the level of credibility (Holt et 
al. 2009: 22). The Capstone Doctrine holds that capabilities are essential because an 
operation with low credibility is likely to become ineffective and marginalized, i.a. due 
to possibly eroding consent, which would endanger the operational legitimacy (UN 
2008: 35). The importance of ‘international legitimacy’ for success is closely linked to its 
credibility. Legitimacy comprises three mutually reinforcing and interlinked aspects, 
which are: moral authority, political consensus, and legality (Wiharata 2009: 96). 
Legitimacy can be seen as both, a component as well as the product of an operation’s 
credibility. Finally, due to the variety of actors involved in peacekeeping operations 
today, well-organized cooperation among the engaged parties is essential for the success 
of peacekeeping operations (MacDermott and Hanssen 2010: 60).  
In summary, credibility and commitment are particularly important for the successful 
conduction of a peacekeeping operation, i.a. because they comprise and evoke other 
conditions, which are recognized to impact the success of peacekeeping operations. 
Without one of the two, the operation is likely to fail. Reasons for why peacekeeping 
operations still fall short in their ambition to protect civilians can be linked to unclear 
mandates, matched with insufficient resources and overall low commitment (Holt et al. 
2009: 77). 
 
Assessing prospects for success and failure 
Assessing whether an operation has been successful based on an outcome analysis is 
neither a new nor an illuminating approach. Judgments on success and failure are often 
premature because establishing and maintaining peace are long term ambitions. 
Drawing conclusions on whether the operation has succeeded or failed before its 
withdrawal or even shortly after are rushed and potentially misguided. Moreover, calling 
an ongoing operation out for having failed to implement its mandate can have severe 
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consequences on the credibility of a peacekeeping operation, which in turn can 
influence both its legitimacy and effectiveness. Further, being aware of whether an 
operation has succeeded or failed is only marginally enlightening. More relevant for the 
improvement of peacekeeping efforts are analyses that determine what has contributed 
to the success or failure of an operation. Nevertheless, the analysis of preconditions and 
the exploration of how these necessities can be created or maintained is a less common 
approach towards the evaluation of peacekeeping operations. Thus, the objective of this 
thesis is to create greater awareness of the importance of preconditions for success. To 
this end, this thesis is going to investigate the presence of two vital preconditions for the 
fulfillment of the POC mandate in two case studies, UNMISS and MONUSCO. Based on 
an assessment of their status quo, the findings will give an indication of the prospects 
for the two operations to succeed or fail in the implementation of their POC mandate.  
Difficulties of evaluating the prospects for success of peacekeeping operations arise from 
the fact that preconditions are often intangible and do not always lend themselves to 
direct quantification. Therefore, measurable indicators are needed to serve as a way to 
assess the outcome. Moreover, it is difficult to isolate the impact of the operation from 
the present political, social and economic contexts in which peacekeepers are deployed. 
Even the most thorough analysis will not be able to conclusively evaluate how the 
conflict situation would have developed without the presence of peacekeepers. 
Attempting to take such constraints into account, this thesis is going to approach the 
investigation of the research question with a model that bases its conclusion, regarding 
prospects for success or failure, on the presence of preconditions that are widely viewed 
as determining factors for the efficiency of peacekeeping operations. Simultaneously, 
limitations and documented constraints to the work of the peacekeepers, including 
situational circumstances, must be taken into account before a conclusion on the 
implications of the findings can be drawn. How this model is applied to the two case 
studies will be explained in the following chapter. 
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3. Methodology 
To date, peacekeeping operations oftentimes continue to struggle to fulfill their POC 
mandate. Failure to implement an assigned mandate can have various reasons. One of 
the main reasons, however, is the lack of preconditions required for the successful 
implementation. By investigating to what extent, the necessary preconditions for the 
successful implementation of the assigned POC mandate are present in the 
peacekeeping operations UNMISS in South Sudan, and MONUSCO in the DRC, this 
thesis aims to enhance the understanding of the fulfillment of the POC mandate and 
preconditions that influence its implementation in peacekeeping operations. Examining 
prospects for success in peacekeeping operations, based on the presence of required 
preconditions, will further unfold ways to improve the efficacy of peacekeeping efforts.  
Based on reports of steadily growing numbers of reported civilian fatalities in South 
Sudan (ACLED A 2017: n.p.), and declining numbers in the DRC, the following 
hypotheses result: 
× H1: The peacekeeping operation UNMISS does not have the necessary 
preconditions to fulfill its mandate for the Protection of Civilians. 
× H2: The peacekeeping operation MONUSCO does have the necessary 
preconditions to fulfill its mandate for the Protection of Civilians. 
To test these hypotheses, this thesis is going to analyze the two peacekeeping operations 
and investigate the presence of two vital preconditions for the successful fulfillment of 
their POC mandate. The findings of the analysis are going to be illustrated by a cross-
case-study comparison between UNMISS and MONUSCO. The two operations were 
selected based on their comparability, which arises mainly from the primary focus that 
both operations place on POC in their mandate, including the clause to ‘take all 
necessary means’ to protect civilians. Moreover, the UN has stationed its peacekeeping 
forces in both countries for a considerable long period of time. That means that both 
operations have been developed out of previous operations, which ought to have given 
the forces sufficient time to gain a thorough understanding of the conflicts, to develop 
and improve their efforts according to the situation in the field. The two operations 
constitute most similar cases and are thus best suitable for comparative analysis. 
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The investigated conditions in this analysis are credibility and commitment, because of 
their absoluteness for the success of peacekeeping operations, and their encompassing 
properties these preconditions are particularly significant. Neither credibility nor 
commitment is directly measurable. Therefore, indicators will shed light on their 
presence or absence, which constitutes the most efficient way to gain information on 
their presence or absence. The use of indicators to reveal information about directly 
unmeasurable matters is a common and recognized approach to conducting research. 
To ensure the validity and possibility of replication, the chosen indicators must be 
observable manifestations of the presence of credibility and commitment. The 
indicators for credibility are manifestations of trust and faith held by the local 
community in the ability of the peacekeepers, impartiality, as well as a clear, actionable 
mandate, which presents an understanding of the conflict and protection targets. 
Indicators for commitment are material and political support for the operation, 
encompassing an appropriate budget, troop strength, equipment and UNSC support to 
fulfill the assigned mandate. Whether and to what extent those indicators are present 
will be investigated by indicator questions. Due to the limited scope of the thesis, only 
a relatively small number of indicator questions are used to assess the preconditions. If 
possible, future and more extensive studies should include more questions to increase 
the significance of the results. Nevertheless, the number of indicator questions in this 
analysis is sufficient to draw a conclusive and gain valid result. That is because one or 
more questions are asked per precondition and respective indicator that encompasses 
the analyzed preconditions, which, taken together, give an appropriate impression to 
draw conclusions on presence or absence of the preconditions. 
The analysis is going to apply a model based on Diehl and Druckman’s Evaluation 
Framework. The framework was modified, to not show whether the peacekeeping 
operations were conclusively successful, as initially intended by Diehl and Druckman, 
but to give an indication on whether the two operations can be expected to fulfill their 
mandate, by investigating the presence of preconditions for successful execution of their 
POC mandate.  
The POC mandate encompasses a complex variety of responsibilities, which can be 
divided into three realms. Since not all three can be investigated in this research, the 
main focus will lie on credibility and commitment in the military realm, which is one of 
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the two core dimensions to ensure the immediate and comprehensive integrity and 
protection of civilians; the second core dimension is the humanitarian realm. Besides 
the primary focus on the prospects of success in the military realm, the analysis will 
secondarily also look at the fulfillment of humanitarian responsibilities. Investigating 
both dimensions will provide a comprehensive analysis and thus understanding of the 
prospects for and potential obstacles to the success of the operations to protect civilians 
as assigned in their mandate.  
 
 
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 provided a description of the development of 
peacekeeping responsibilities and identified dimensions of POC, as well as 
preconditions essential for its successful implementation. This research marked Step 1 
of the model (see fig. 1). While Diehl and Druckman identify outcome-goals of the 
peacekeeping operation, Step 1 in the model used in this thesis, explores the 
preconditions peacekeeping operations must aim for to implement their POC mandate 
successfully. For Step 2, indicator questions are identified that will yield information on 
the presence or absence of credibility and commitment in the military realm. In Step 3, 
Phase I, the posed indicator questions are answered. The findings will predominantly be 
gained through qualitative research, at times complemented by quantitative research. 
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Qualitative research is the most suitable method to answer the research question of this 
thesis because the assessment of success and failure in peacekeeping operations requires 
an in-depth analysis of indicators that point towards the outcome of the operation. 
Insights provided by quantitative research alone would not be sufficient for this kind of 
thick research conducted. Subsequently, Step 3, Phase II, is going to examine the 
humanitarian dimension and review steps towards the fulfillment of the POC mandate 
so far. Both phases of Step 3 are explored in Chapter 4. In Step 4, which can be found in 
Chapter 5, the findings and answers to the questions will be discussed, and compared, 
in order to draw conclusions on the posed research question. Finally, Step 5, which is 
part of Chapter 6, examines limitation, situational factors and the conditions in which 
peacekeepers are working in, which need to be taken into consideration. 
Important to note is that while specific requirements for peacekeeping operations are 
varying, depending on the situational and local circumstances in which peacekeepers 
are deployed, the necessity for sufficient credibility and commitment are virtually 
universal preconditions, essential for the successful fulfillment of assigned mandates.  
Although the method used in this thesis is most suitable for the performed research, 
limitations restrain definite and overarching conclusions that can be drawn from this 
analysis. For instance, was it not possible to conduct interviews with South Sudanese 
and Congolese civilians to inquire directly about their perception of security and the 
role the respective peacekeeping operation plays to protect from violence. Instead, 
secondary sources were studied to unfold such information. Unfortunately, the total of 
studies, investigating civilians’ views is quite limited; thus, the number of sources used 
to this end was accordingly relatively low. Moreover, due to the scope of this thesis, and 
the ambition to carry out an in-depth investigation of the presence or absence of the 
preconditions, merely two factors were explored in this analysis. A greater number of 
preconditions would draw an even clearer picture of the prospects for success in both 
operations. Nevertheless, the findings are valid and reliable, in regards to the posed 
research question, since they form an adequate response to the investigated problem.  
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4. Analysis 
4.1. Case Study: UNMISS in South Sudan 
 
 
 
Historical background and development of the current mandate 
After more than two decades of brutal civil war in Sudan, fought between the ‘Arab 
Islamists’ government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the warring parties 
reached a ‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ (CPA) in January 2005, which brought an 
end to the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). The CPA initiated a peace process 
which was supervised by the subsequently deployed UN peacekeeping operation UNMIS 
(United Nations Mission in Sudan), based on UNSC Resolution 1590. The operation was 
assigned with providing humanitarian assistance and supporting the implementation of 
the CPA (S/RES/1590 2005). The agreement i.a. affirmed provisional autonomy for the 
South, followed by a referendum, which was to officially endorse independence. The 
referendum was held in 2011, in which “an overwhelming majority of the South Sudanese 
people voted in favor of secession from the North” (Breidlid and Lie 2013: 144). Following 
the independence of the newly established Republic of South Sudan, UNMIS ended in 
July 2011 and was immediately replaced by UNMISS. Initially, UNMISS was deployed 
with 7,000 military personnel, 900 civilian police personnel and an ‘appropriate civilian 
Fig. 2: Timeline of conflict and UN deployment in South Sudan, since 2011, (Wistuba 2017) 
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component’, primarily assigned with supporting the newly established nation through 
capacity building (Willmot et al. 2016: 362). Yet, after renewed political and security-
related crises, in particular, the beginning of the South Sudanese Civil War in December 
2013, the mandate was revised soon after. Since then, the size of the peacekeeping 
operation has increased, and POC has become the core responsibility for UNMISS. The 
current mandate authorized the operation to “use all necessary means” to “protect 
civilians under threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of such violence, 
within its capacity and areas of deployment” (S/RES/2155 2014). Efforts to comply with 
its mandate for POC i.a. initiated the establishment of POC sites in various locations 
throughout the country, to shelter IDP. 
The following section is going to investigate whether the preconditions for a successful 
implementation of the POC mandate are present. To this end, the presence of the two 
most important preconditions for success, which are credibility and commitment, in the 
military realm of UNMISS will be examined. Following the model adapted from Diehl 
and Druckman’s Evaluation Framework, questions to investigate their presence are 
asked and answered. Moreover, the development of the humanitarian situation in South 
Sudan will be explored, as it sheds light on the environment the peacekeepers are 
working in and reveals challenges to their efforts to carry out their POC mandate.  
 
Phase I 
Questions to investigate commitment of the military realm 
× How many military officers are deployed to protect civilians? Does the force 
strength appear to be appropriate for the mandated tasks? 
The initial mandate authorized the deployment of 7,000 military personnel, with an 
option to reduce this ceiling to 6,000 after an evaluation of the situation in the first three 
to six months. After the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, UNMISS’s capacities, 
however, were increased significantly. The mandate S/RES/2155 (2014) authorized 
“12,500 troops of all ranks and a police component, including appropriate Formed Police 
Units, of up to 1,323 personnel” (S/RES/2155 2014: 8). UNSC Resolution 2327 (2016), 
authorized further increase of capabilities, to now hold a troop ceiling of 17,000 troops, 
comprising 4,000 Regional Protection Forces, and increasing the number of police 
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personnel to 2,101, and, an appropriate civilian component (S/RES/2327 2016: 6). 
UNMISS’s growing troop strength appears to be appropriate for the mandated tasks. 
 
× Have the capacities, here measured in troop strength, increased since the 
deployment to match the circumstantial needs? 
Since their deployment, the presence of UNMISS troops in South Sudan has increased.  
 
× Are the military personnel appropriately equipped to carry out their tasks?  
Various external reports and Independent Special Investigations into the conduct of 
UNMISS troops conclude that the operation is insufficiently equipped (UN 2016; HPN 
2017; CCC 2016; MSF 2016). The list of identified deficiencies reaches from material 
shortcomings to insufficient support from actors that ought to collaborate with the 
military personnel to ensure an efficient and successful execution of tasks. For example, 
a report conducted by the Humanitarian Practice Network finds that UNMISS lacks key 
equipment, such as bulletproof material to reinforce the guard towers (HPN 2017: 14). 
This lack of appropriate preparations and means oftentimes results in weak and 
insufficient responses to erupting violence (ibid.: 17).  
Further, in order to be fully equipped to fulfill their military tasks, peacekeepers must 
be guaranteed appropriate medical care in cases of injuries. UNMISS troops lack such 
‘safety net’, which caused the death of at least one peacekeeper during the fighting in 
Juba in July 2016 (MSF 2016: 20). The UN bases were not medically equipped with blood 
banks and surgical teams. Moreover, UNMISS was not able to negotiate the evacuation 
of injured peacekeepers to a nearby hospital (CCC 2016: 5). This lack of appropriate 
equipment and preparation partially stems from impairment by the South Sudanese 
government, i.e. to obstruct the import of military helicopters and the deployment of 
troops and partially from the UNSC’s failure to appropriately respond to such external 
obstruction (BBC Podcast 2017: n.p.).  
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× Has the operation been granted a budget that is appropriate for the tasks to be 
carried out? 
Since the outbreak of civil war in 2013, the operation has been provided with a 
considerable budget, which makes it one of the bigger operations in terms of financing. 
Rolandsen remarks that only the outbreak of violence resulted in larger budgets for 
UNMISS and new, more complex tasks, “for which – when there had still been a peace 
to be kept – had been subjected to accusations of inefficiency and irrelevance” 
(Rolandsen 2015: 357). Critics hold that the increased budget was authorized too late 
(ibid.). 
 
× Is the UNSC perceived to have provided adequate support for the operation? 
No, several reports find that the UNSC has not provided adequate political and material 
support to the operation (HPN 2017: 14; CCC 2016: 7). Beyond the threat of imposing 
sanctions against the Sudanese government, if it continues to impede UNMISS 
peacekeepers in their work and to obstruct the swift delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
no tangible steps, such as an arms embargo, have been taken. The UNSC has failed to 
take “meaningful action to challenge the Government of South Sudan as it repeatedly 
obstructed the movements and functioning of UNMISS.” (CCC 2016: 5). The failure of 
the UNSC to respond to such acts of impediment to UNMISS “has weakened the Mission 
and peacekeeping as an institution” (HPN 2017: 14). 
 
Questions to investigate credibility of the military realm 
× Does the mandate (S/RES/2155) and assigned tasks reflect an understanding of 
the 1) conflict, 2) sources of threat to civilians, 3) most vulnerable people? 
Yes, the mandate shows 1) an understanding of the conflict, 2) the sources of insecurity 
and the threats to the wellbeing of civilians. Moreover, the mandate identifies 3) the 
most vulnerable people and assigns a particular focus on these groups (S/RES/2155 2014: 
4). Concrete approaches and strategies to effectively ensure the civilian protection are 
also listed, providing a sound starting point to plan detailed action plans (ibid.).  
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× Is the mandate clearly and actionably formulated?  
Yes, overall, the mandate can be considered as clearly formulated, addressing the most 
important aspects and strategies to ensure the civilian protection. Moreover, the tasks 
are actionably outlined. 
 
× Are military peacekeepers perceived as capable to provide security from violence? 
No, the trust of the South Sudanese people in the capability of UNMISS peacekeepers to 
provide adequate protection has decreased significantly in the past years. After the 
outbreak of the civil war in 2013, concerns have been raised by the local and international 
community over UNMISS’s ability to protect civilians adequately in the newly tensed 
circumstances (IRRI 2015: 12). In the years following, numerous incidents in which 
civilians were killed and in which UNMISS peacekeepers were made responsible became 
vocal. In particular, the ‘Juba clashes’ in 2016 shed a negative light on the effectiveness 
of the peacekeepers. It revealed insufficient control and command, and the inability of 
peacekeepers to prevent such attacks (UN 2016: 5). Civilians further report that UNMISS 
peacekeepers “are easily intimidated, especially outside the camps” (MSF 2016: 5). The 
clashes and following reports had a negative impact on the perception of UNMISS’s 
capability to provide security for civilians.  
In addition, many civilians living in POC sites say that more peacekeepers are needed to 
increase their sense of security within the sites, and outside (MSF 2016: 5). However, it 
is important to note that the perception of the performance of peacekeepers varies. 
Unrealistically high and misguided expectations can be distorted from realistically 
actionable improvements (Nadin et al. 2014: 104).  
The HPN-report describes that certain units, such as Mongolian peacekeepers, are 
particularly respected for their “willingness to deploy to high-risk environments and to 
use force when necessary to protect civilians” (HPN 2017: 15). Other peacekeepers, like 
those, who abandoned their post during the escalation of the ‘Malakal violence’, on the 
other hand, are perceived as incapable of providing adequate security (ibid.).  
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× Is the leadership of the operation UNMISS perceived as effective? 
No, the operation’s leadership is not perceived as effective. In July 2016, the ‘Juba clashes’ 
broke out, which killed not only docents of civilians, but also entailed the sexual assault 
and killing of peacekeepers. This incident, as well as the ‘Malakal violence’ from 
February 2016, casted a particular bad light on the conduct of the peacekeeping 
operation. UN Secretary-General at the time, Ban, demanded the examination of the 
‘Juba clashes’ and the operation’s response to the attacks. The aim was to ascertain 
whether UNMISS personnel responded appropriately (UN 2016: 1). The resulting report 
revealed that UNMISS failed to act upon “timely and accurate warning signs” (ibid.: 2). 
Moreover, “mission-wide and integrated coordination was poor before and during the 
crisis” (ibid.: 3), and the leadership left much to be desired (ibid.: 2). Ineffective 
command and control, unpreparedness, as well as “risk-averse” or “inward looking 
posture” (ibid. 5) were divulged as main contributing factors for the magnitude of the 
‘Juba clashes’. The pessimistic view on the competent leadership of the operation is not 
exclusive to the ‘Juba clashes’, lack of control and command has also been criticized in 
other contexts.  
 
× Is the peacekeeping operation perceived as impartial? 
When the relationship between the South Sudanese government and UNMISS grew 
increasingly tense, allegations against the peacekeeping operation have been raised by 
senior officials of the government that UNMISS was aiding anti-government forces. The 
UN, however, rejects these accusations as “unfounded” (UNMISS n.d.: n.p.). The 
research for this analysis revealed no evidence of a large share of the civilian population 
perceiving UNMISS’s acts as partial. 
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Progress analysis of the military realm 
× Have safe sites been created?  
Yes, since 2014, UNMISS has set up six POC sites, which (as of April 2017) shelter more 
than 218,000 IDP (UNMISS 2017: 1). With the increasing number of IDP, the total of 
civilians seeking protection in the sites is steadily rising. The POC sites are considered a 
transitional solution and last resort to protect IDP. The aim is to find more sustainable 
solutions.  
 
× Do people feel safe living in the POC sites? 
No, the majority of people living in the POC sites in South Sudan do not feel safe. The 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) conducted research that revealed that overall 83% of 
the civilians living inside the POC sites do not feel safe (MSF 2016: 4). In particular, 
UNMISS’s slow response to the attacks on POC sites in February and July 2016, and their 
inability to restore confidence in their capabilities, have shattered the perception that 
peacekeepers will be able to protect civilians from violence (ibid.: 11). The survey further 
revealed a positive correlation between how safe civilians felt and the proximity to UN 
peacekeeping forces (ibid.: 4). Moreover, the MSF accounts that the situation in the sites 
is challenging, with food insecurity, insufficient living space, and sexual violence 
characterizing the everyday-life in the sites (ibid.: 9). Nevertheless, civilians still 
consider life inside the POC sites as more secure than outside (IRRI 2015: 4).  
 
× Do people feel safe outside in the POC sites? 
No, civilians report that they do not feel safe outside of the sites. Patrolling of 
peacekeepers outside of the sites is reported to be insufficient (ibid.: 4).  
 
Development of the situation since the deployment (2011) 
× Has the number of civilian fatalities declined since the deployment?  
No, the number of civilian fatalities in South Sudan has not declined since the 
deployment in 2011 (ACLED A 2017: n.p.). Threats to civilians’ integrity arise both from 
armed conflict and from the dramatically deteriorating humanitarian situation (OCHA 
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2016: 1). Violence does not seem to cease, conflict and riots persistently flare, putting the 
life of civilians in danger.  
 
× Has the number of IDP declined since the deployment?  
No, the number of IDP has not declined since the deployment of UNMISS in 2011. On 
the contrary, the number of people forced to flee their homes has increased dramatically. 
Since December 2013, about 3.4 million people have been displaced. Thereof, from 
September until December 2016 alone, 500,000 people have been forced to leave their 
homes (UNNC C 2017: n.p.). That entails that the number of civilians who ought to be 
protected by peacekeepers has respectively increased as well. The UN describes this 
situation as “Africa’s worst refugee crisis” (UNNC E 2017: n.p.).  
 
× Has the number of reported cases of sexual violence declined since the 
deployment?  
No, the number of reported cases of sexual violence has not declined since the 
deployment of UNMISS in 2011. On the contrary, the number of victims has increased 
significantly and is in danger of rising even more (UNNC D 2017: n.p.). The situation in 
South Sudan is particularly grave with sexual violence targeted even at young children 
and senior women (UNNC B 2017: n.p.). 
 
Phase II 
The Humanitarian Situation 
Important to note is that threats to civilian well-being do not solely arise from armed 
violence, but also from the consequences of the conflict, and environmental factors. In 
South Sudan, civilians’ integrity is jeopardized by both food insecurity and contagious 
diseases. In 2013, before the renewed outbreak of civil war, about 46% of the population 
was estimated to be suffering from minimal or no food insecurity. All civilians were 
located on levels below IPC level 41 (IPC 2013: n.p.). In 2014, an increase in people living 
                                                
 
1 The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale classifies the severity of food insecurity 
into five phases from “1 – Minimal” to “5 – Famine”. 
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in crisis or emergency food insecurity phases (level 3-4) was reported. That year, more 
than 3.5 million people, which makes up 30% of the population, were found to be in 
imminently critical situations (IPC A 2014: n.p.). In early 2017, those figures rose even 
more, with almost 5 million people estimated to suffer from severe food insecurity (IPC 
levels 3-5) (IPC A 2017: n.p.). According to UNICEF, about 1 million civilians are living 
on the edge of famine (UNICEF C 2017: 2). 
As a consequence of the critical food situation, as well as inadequate access to clean 
water and sanitary facilities, the medical situation for South Sudanese civilians has 
worsened dramatically. The outbreak of diseases such as measles, chicken pox, and 
cholera have been reported, which pose a lethal threat to the South Sudanese population 
(UNICEF C 2017: 1; UNNC B 2017: n.p.). 
Humanitarian aid is only partially able to accesses civilians in need. The environment in 
which humanitarian workers are deployed to is dangerous. Workers are threatened by 
the ongoing conflict in which they become a target of violence. As of May 2017, more 
than 80 humanitarian workers have been killed (UNNC A 2017: n.p.). The UN reports 
that South Sudan is considered to be “one of the most dangerous places for humanitarian 
workers” (UNNC B 2017: n.p.). Moreover, severe weather conditions disrupt the 
distribution of aid (UNNC C 2017: n.p.). Additionally, humanitarian undertakings in 
South Sudan commonly lack the means and support to deliver humanitarian aid and 
provide effective assistance to civilians in need. Most humanitarian projects suffer from 
significant funding gaps. On the official website of UNICEF, it is reported that as of 
October 2016, only $113 million of the appealed $165 million funds for its projects have 
been received, which totals merely 69% of the requested money (UNICEF 2016: n.p.). 
UNICEF for South Sudan is not an isolated case, most other humanitarian organizations 
reporting to UN peacekeeping operations suffer from insufficient monetary support, 
often less than half of the required funding is met (SC/12748 2017: n.p.).  
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4.2. Case Study: MONUSCO in the DRC 
 
 
Historical background and development of the current mandate 
In July 1999, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUC) was deployed in the DRC, following the signing of the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement, which was an attempt to put an end to the Second Congo War 
(1998-2003). The ceasefire was concluded between the DRC and five regional states, 
which were Namibia, Angola, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Uganda. The 5,000 troops strong 
MONUC operation was tasked with monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire and 
supporting the disengagement of the belligerent forces (S/RES/1279 1999: 3). In the 
months following the signing of the ceasefire, tension rose once again, and violence 
flared up. Thereupon, the UNSC expanded MONUC’s mandate, assigning multiple 
additional tasks to their observatory function. Under UNSC Resolution 1925, in May 
2010, MONUC was renamed to MONUSCO. The new operation expanded its focus from 
being assigned mainly with political tasks to the protection of civilians and consolidation 
of peace. MONUSCO was comprised of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 
391 police personnel and 1,050 members of formed police units, as well as an ‘appropriate 
civilian component’, which were authorized to use all necessary means to carry out the 
mandate (S/RES/1925 2010: 3). While MONUSCO was mandated with POC from the 
beginning, its emphasis on POC as its priority grew over the first years of its deployment. 
In reaction to the continuously worsening humanitarian situation, with persistent 
Fig. 3: Timeline of conflict and UN deployment in the DRC, since 2010, (Wistuba 2017) 
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violence characterizing everyday life in the DRC, in 2013, the UNSC approved the 
deployment of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to take offensive action against militia 
groups that threatened peace, state authority, and civilians’ security in the country 
(S/RES/2098 2013). The FIB encompassed 3,069 soldiers, which were mandated to act in 
a “robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with 
international law” (S/RES/2211 2015: 5). 
Following the same structure as the previous case study analysis, the subsequent section 
is going to investigate whether the preconditions for a successfully implemented POC 
mandate are present in the peacekeeping operation MONUSCO. Again, the presence of 
the credibility and commitment, in the military realm will be examined in the first phase. 
The second phase, examines the development of the humanitarian situation in the DRC, 
as it sheds light on situational challenges and limitations. 
 
Phase I 
Questions to investigate commitment of the military realm 
× How many military officers are deployed to protect civilians? Does the force 
strength appear to be appropriate for the mandated tasks? 
The mandate S/RES/1925 authorized the deployment of 19,815 military personnel, 760 
military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel, 1,050 personnel of formed 
police units” (S/RES/1925 2010: 3). In 2015, by UNSC Resolution 2211, the UNSC decided 
to reduce the force by 2,000 troops, while remaining within the authorized troop ceiling 
of 19,815 military personnel. In the context of growing tension between MONUSCO and 
the DRC government, which is insisting on an exit strategy for the peacekeeping 
operation, in March 2017 UNSC Resolution 2348 was adopted, which decided that 
MONUSCO’s force would further be reduced to comprise 16,215 military personnel 
(S/RES/2348 2017: 9). Over the years, the world’s largest peacekeeping operation has 
decreased its authorized troop ceiling, as well as its force deployed in the DRC. Despite 
recent reductions in troop strength, the operation appears to have an appropriate 
number of fighting units for its mandated tasks. 
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× Have the capacities, here measured in troop strength, increased since the 
deployment to match the circumstantial needs? 
Over time, the presence of MONUSCO troops in the DRC had at first increased yet is 
currently decreasing. 
 
× Are the military personnel appropriately equipped to carry out their tasks?  
Supported by the highest budget the UN has ever granted to one of its peacekeeping 
operations, MONUSCO’s military personnel can be considered as appropriately 
equipped. In an interview with the African Defense Review, Lt. Gen. Mgwebi, Force 
Commander of MONUSCO, expressed that difficulties to eliminate hostile forces in the 
DRC do not stem from insufficient equipment. On the contrary, he holds that 
MONSCUO’s equipment is “enough” (ADR 2016: n.p.).  
In the first years after its deployment, before MONUSCO’s mandate became as ‘robust’ 
as it is today, the operation faced harsh criticism regarding its ineffectiveness, which 
some observers viewed as the result of inadequate equipment (Hatcher 2012: n.p.). Since 
2013, in response to the worsening security situation in the DRC, MONUSCO grew 
increasingly robust, both in its mandate and capabilities. In March 2013, the FIB was 
established as part of the MONUSCO operation. The FIB was authorized through 
Resolution 2098, and was assigned to carry out directed offensive operations to 
“neutralize and disarm” (S/RES/2098 2013: 6) rebel groups, which were considered to 
pose a threat to civilian security and state authority, in order to “make space for 
stabilization activities” (ibid.). The FIB cooperated with the Congolese National Army 
FARDC in this undertaking.  
Overall, in recent years, MONUSCO has been praised for its development of innovative 
techniques and processes to carry out their POC mandate. For example, concepts such 
as ‘Joint Protection Teams’ or its implementation of robust peacekeeping through the 
introduction of the FIB, the MONUSCO is pioneering in terms of novel approaches to 
POC in the DRC (CCC 2016: 1). Thus, to date, MONUSCO, supported by the FIB, can be 
considered as adequately equipped in the military realm to carry out assigned tasks. 
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× Has the operation been granted a budget that is appropriate for the tasks to be 
carried out?  
MONUSCO is the largest mission ever deployed in UN history and has been granted the 
highest budget to cover its costs, currently being given about $1.24 billion (MONUSCO 
n.d.: n.p.). Overall, in comparison to other peacekeeping operations, MONUSCO has 
been granted an appropriate budget to carry out its tasks. 
 
× Is the UNSC perceived to have provided adequate support for the operation? 
The research for this analysis did neither reveal criticism of a perceived lack of, nor 
particular praise for outstanding support provided by UNSC for MONUSCO.  
 
Questions to investigate credibility of the military realm 
× Does the mandate, and assigned tasks (S/RES/1925, and updated mandates) 
reflect an understanding of the 1) conflict, 2) sources of threat to civilians, 3) most 
vulnerable people? 
Yes, the mandate reflects 1) an understanding of the conflict, 2) the sources of insecurity 
and threats to the security of civilians, yet, 3) the mandate does not directly identify the 
most vulnerable groups of people. Only indirectly, women, children, and IDP are 
mentioned as groups at risk of violence. Updated and extended mandates identify the 
most vulnerable groups more clearly.  
 
× Is the mandate clearly and actionably formulated?  
Yes, the mandate determined by S/RES/1925, as well as all updated mandates, which 
reaffirm MONUSCO’s priority of POC “in decisions about the use of available capacity 
and resources” (S/RES/1991 2011: 2), are explicitly formulated, addressing the key aspects 
and strategies to guarantee the civilian protection. The mandate, its pursuits, and tasks 
can be described as clear and actionable. 
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× Are military peacekeepers perceived as capable to provide security from violence? 
The perception of MONUSCO’s performance and capability to protect civilians varies 
widely throughout the country. In 2016, the Congo Research Institute (CRG) conducted 
a representative study in which civilians’ perception of MONUSCO was investigated. 
Nationwide, 63% of the people viewed MONUSCO as ‘performing well at protecting 
civilians’. Interestingly, in areas of high deployment, fewer people considered 
MONUSCO’s impact as positive; only 30%-40% agreed that peacekeepers were able to 
provide security to the population (CRG 2016: 33). Two years prior, the perception of 
MONUSCO’s capability to protect civilians had been less positive. A survey by the 
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and United Nations Development Programme in 2014 
revealed low levels of trust in the capabilities of MONUSCO. Only 25% of the 
respondents expressed to trust MONUSCO’s ability to protect civilians, and 34% felt that 
the operation did nothing to guard civilians against violence and harm (Vinck and Pham 
2014: 52). Further, 77% of the respondents considered the input of MONUSCO to the 
overall level of security in the DRC as being “weak to non-existent” (ibid.: 54). Criticism 
was also voiced on social media, where MONSUCO was mocked with the hashtag 
#MONUSELESS, in light of its decade-long deployment, without significant 
improvement of the situation (Raghavan 2013: n.p.). In the same year, representatives of 
the Congolese civil society expressed that the trust between MONUSCO and the local 
community has eroded since their deployment (ACSO 2014: 3).  
More recent investigations revealed that the general public opinion in the DRC is mixed 
regarding whether MONUSCO should remain deployed or leave the country. According 
to a study conducted by the CRG, disclosed that 55% of the respondents think that 
MONUSCO peacekeepers should remain deployed, and 29% expressed that the 
peacekeeping operation should leave. This suggests that today the peacekeeping 
operation is considered as making a difference in the perception of security for civilians 
to date (CRG 2016: 32). Nationwide, 63% of the people perceive MONSUCO to be 
fulfilling its core responsibility, the POC mandate. Interestingly, the operation is 
particularly unpopular in areas in which the most troops are deployed (ibid.). In 
summary, to date, the majority of Congolese civilians views the peacekeepers as capable 
to protect civilians, despite greater distrust in the past. 
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× Is the leadership of the operation MONUSCO perceived as effective? 
While at times in the past voices were raised, that peacekeepers were unwilling to follow 
orders (Rhoads 2016: 153), there appear to be no major concerns regarding the ineffective 
leadership of MONUSCO to date. Important to note is that in a peacekeeping operation, 
encompassing the large numbers of peacekeeping troops, it is not uncommon that 
reports of shortcomings in the effectiveness of control and command in certain 
situations and circumstances are voiced at times. Nevertheless, the research for this 
analysis did not divulge current discontent with the leadership of MONUSCO. Overall, 
the operation can be considered as having good control and command, as well as 
leadership over its troops (Kuele and Cepik 2017: 61). 
 
× Is the peacekeeping operation perceived as impartial? 
Representatives of the Congolese civil society criticized that MONUSCO is relying too 
heavily on information provided by the FARDC, which is perceived to constrict their 
ability to work independently. Besides, insufficient information also reduces credibility 
and the strategic ability of the peacekeeping operation (CCC 2016: 2). Moreover, overall 
17% perceived the operation as ‘very corrupt’, in conflict-affected areas this number rose 
up to 24%, and only 36% described MONUSCO as not corrupt (CRG 2016: 32).  
 
Progress analysis of the military realm 
× Have safe spaces and environments been created?  
POC sites, as seen in other peacekeeping operations, like UNMISS in South Sudan, have 
not been set up in the DRC. 
 
× Do people feel safe living in the POC sites? 
This question does not apply because POC sites have not been set up in the DRC. 
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× Do people feel safe living outside the POC sites? 
A study conducted by the CRG revealed that perception of security varied depending on 
the region and whether people were living in urban areas, in which 43% of the 
respondents said that they did not feel safe walking alone at night, compared to 32% in 
the countryside (CRG 2016: 18). The overall perception of 37% of the respondents was 
that the security situation has deteriorated in the past five years, despite the DRC 
officially being in a post-conflict period. Only around 15% viewed an improvement, and 
38% said that the security situation has not changed in the past five years (ibid.). 
Interestingly, the report revealed that perception in conflict-ridden areas was more 
positive than in provinces with no military conflict (ibid.). 
 
Development of the situation since the deployment (2010) 
× Has the number of civilian fatalities declined since the deployment?  
Yes. While violence and conflict have increased significantly since 2010, the number of 
reported civilian fatalities has dropped considerably (ACLED B 2017: n.p.). Main sources 
of violence against civilians arise from political militias and state forces (ibid.). 
 
× Has the number of IDP declined since the deployment?  
No, since the deployment of MONUSCO in 2010 the number of IDP has not declined (ID 
n.d.: n.p.). On the contrary, from about 1.75 million IDP in 2010, this number has risen 
to almost 3 million in 2012 until 2014 (ibid.). In 2015, the rate of IDP fell to about 1.5 
million but had increased since then to close to 2.25 million in 2016 (ibid.). The exact 
numbers of IDP vary; OCHA claims that 2.1 million people were displaced in 2016, while 
UNICEF holds that the number of IDP lays around 2.2 million (UNICEF A 2017: n.p.; 
OCHA n.d.: 2).  
 
× Has the number of reported cases of sexual violence declined since the 
deployment?  
Yes. While initially increasing significantly, and peaking in 2013, the number of reported 
cases of sexual violence has been decreasing since 2015 (ibid.). 
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Phase II 
The Humanitarian Situation 
Civilians in the DRC are threatened not only by continuing conflict and violence but also 
by food insecurity and fatal diseases. In 2014, about 4.1 million people were on level 3 or 
4 on the IPC scale, which indicates acute food and livelihood crises (IPC B 2014: n.p.). In 
2017, this number rose to 5.9 million Congolese on level 3 or 4 (IPC B 2017: n.p.). 
Reportedly, for 2017 stable levels of food inequity are expected in the non-conflict areas 
of the country (FEWS 2017: n.p.). Due to continuing conflict and displacement of 
civilians, as well as climatic disruptions, which affect the crop production, the ‘food 
situation’ has fluctuated but not improved since the deployment of MONUSCO in 2010.  
Also, the national health situation in the DRC has not improved since the deployment 
of MONUSCO. While some diseases, such as measles, are on the decline in the DRC, 
other serious health threats have increased in the past months (MSF 2015: n.p.). In May 
2017, cases of Ebola-related deaths were reported (WHO 2017: n.p.). Also, cases of 
cholera are persistent; at the end of 2016 the epidemic seemed to be under control, yet 
suddenly began to spread again in early 2017. Currently, about 4.8 million people are at 
risk of cholera (UNICEF B 2017: 1). Also, despite pre-emptive immunization campaigns, 
the continued spread of measles poses a threat to civilian well-being (ibid.: 2). 
Humanitarian workers in the DRC are also hampered in their work through violence, 
weather extremes, and the significant funding gaps between appealed budgets and the 
granted funds.  
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5. Discussion 
This thesis aimed to investigate foundations for success or failure in UN peacekeeping 
operations needed to implement their POC mandate. The analysis was conducted on a 
cross-case-study comparison between UNMISS and MONUSCO. Since both operations 
are still ongoing, drawing conclusions on whether the POC mandate was successfully 
implemented would be premature. Therefore, this thesis explored whether the two 
operations have the foundation for fulfilling their mandate successfully, based on the 
presence of necessary preconditions for the implementation of the POC mandate. Two 
hypotheses underlie this analysis, one for each case study: 
× H1: The peacekeeping operation UNMISS does not have the necessary 
preconditions to fulfill its mandate for the Protection of Civilians. 
× H2: The peacekeeping operation MONUSCO does have the necessary 
preconditions to fulfill its mandate for the Protection of Civilians. 
 
Meaning of the findings 
The results of the analysis, derived from the answers to the indicator questions, suggest 
that UNMISS has low commitment and low credibility in its military realm. 
Overall, UNMISS was granted a rather high budget and increasing troop strength. In 
this regard, UNMISS has quite high capacities. However, the troops which are deployed 
are insufficiently equipped, which severely undermines effective protection, and leads 
to the evaluation that in practice UNMISS has low capacities. Besides, the UNSC has 
failed to enforce an arms embargo in South Sudan and did not take meaningful actions 
against the obstructions by the South Sudanese government, which hindered 
peacekeepers in their efforts to carry out their work efficiently. Such deficient political 
support casts a poor light on the commitment of the operation. As a result of low 
commitment, including material shortcomings, attacks and clashes took place in which 
peacekeepers were not able to protect civilians, further discrediting the credibility of 
UNMISS.  
On paper, UNMISS enjoys high credibility. It is assigned an actionable mandate, which 
reflects an understanding of the conflict, addresses core issues, vulnerable people, 
authorizes seemingly sufficient troops, and grants a relatively high budget. However, a 
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significant gap between theory and implementation is apparent. On the field, UNMISS’s 
military credibility has suffered severely, mainly due to peacekeepers 
underperformance, and the impact such incidents had on the perceived ability of the 
operation to provide security. Particularly fatal were the ‘Juba clashes’ in 2016. 
Investigations following, revealed poor command and control, leadership, and 
insufficient equipment, which had severe consequences for the faith of the local 
community in the ability of UNMISS to fulfill its mandate. In summary, low military 
credibility of UNMISS is the result of low commitment, including low capabilities and 
low political support, as well as the failure to present a strong stance, and resulting 
incidents in which peacekeepers fell short on civilian protection. 
 
The evaluation of the indicator questions further suggests that MONUSCO’s military 
realm has high commitment and rather high credibility.  
MONUSCO is the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping operation ever 
deployed. It was granted a large budget, and high troop strength – which, is, however, 
slowly decreasing. Nevertheless, the troop strength can be assessed as high, and 
sufficient to meet the mandated responsibilities. MONUSCO troops are furthermore 
well equipped. In particular, the deployment of the FIB with highly trained and armed 
military fighters provided not only increasing abilities in the military realm, contributing 
to overall high capacities but also gave many civilians in the DRC a perception of 
MONUSCO’s strong abilities. The deployment of the FIB reflected an understanding of 
the situational needs, and the commitment of the UNSC to take a firm stance. The UNSC 
supported MONUSCO, i.a. with an arms embargo, established in 2003, and extended in 
June 2016 (SIPRI 2017: n.p.), as well as adequate military capacities, shedding a positive 
light on the credibility of the peacekeeping operation. Taking these factors together, 
MONUSCO encompasses high commitment. 
MONUSCO enjoys high credibility on paper. It is equipped with a clear and actionable 
mandate, presenting an understanding of the dangers for civilians, and addressing core 
issues. Moreover, MONUSCO is armed with high troop strength, large budget to match 
the assigned tasks and thus enjoys rather high military credibility in the DRC. Before the 
adoption of MONUSCO’s robust stance and the deployment of the FIB, numerous 
incidents occurred, in which peacekeepers fell short on the prevention of civilian 
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victimization that gave rise to the perception that MONUSCO was failing to implement 
its mandate. Recently, reports of misconduct and military failures have become less 
frequent, and overall, civilians have gained increasing faith in the ability of the 
peacekeepers. Today, more than half of the people in the DRC believe that MONUSCO 
is doing a good job. The rather high military credibility is a result of presented strength, 
including high commitment and strong equipment. Due to perceived partiality and 
parts of the population, who still distrust MONSUCO's abilities, military credibility is 
assessed as merely ‘rather high’. 
In the military realm, MONUSCO has a significantly stronger foundation and presence 
of required preconditions, compared to UNMISS. While MONUSCO has high 
commitment and rather high credibility, UNMISS has low commitment and low 
credibility. Due to this discrepancy, both operations have differing prospects for success 
and failure in the long term, as will be discussed below. 
In the humanitarian realm, both operations are challenged by similar problems. Both, 
face immense numbers of people in need, yet available means to the humanitarian 
organizations are insufficient, including funding gaps and the apparent unwillingness of 
the international community to meet the appealed budgets, to manage the 
humanitarian crises. Funding gaps are possible because the realm, responsible for food 
and medical assistance, is not covered by the operation’s overall budget. Despite this 
hardship, humanitarian organizations were able to reach a proportion of the people in 
need, and contribute to first measures against the spread of fatal diseases.  
 
Implications of the findings 
As discussed above, UNMISS has low commitment and low credibility, and MONUSCO 
has high commitment and rather high credibility. The presence or absence of 
commitment and credibility has implications on the prospects for success and failure in 
the attempt to fulfill their POC mandate. With reference to findings of scholars who 
have investigated commitment and credibility, and their impact on the outcome of 
peacekeeping operations, the following paragraph is going to discuss the implications of 
the findings for the operations UNMISS and MONSUCO.  
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Low commitment can have severe consequences for peacekeeping operations. In this 
thesis, commitment encompassed capacities, both in terms of budget and troop 
strength, as well as political support, mainly from the UNSC.  
The consequences of poor capacities for an operation are that peacekeepers will not be 
able to carry out their mandate effectively. Similarly, when peacekeeping operations do 
not receive the political support needed to carry out their mandate, they will face 
obstacles that could be avoided with sufficient external support, i.a. from the UNSC. 
Such deficiencies entail further consequences. Shortcomings in capacities and support 
result in underperformance, which jeopardizes the credibility of the operation (Hultman 
et al. 2014: 743).  
Low commitment in UNMISS was predominantly due to the insufficient equipment, and 
low political support. A primary consequence of the low commitment was that 
UNMISS’s military realm suffered from a number of setbacks and underperformance. 
Such incidences had a severe impact on its credibility. MONUSCO has in recent years, 
on the other hand, been provided with the necessary means to carry out its tasks. The 
present commitment had a positive impact on the credibility of the operation.  
Both factors included under the term commitment can be influenced by the UNSC with 
sufficient dedication. Therefore, a gap between theory and practice, mandate and field 
must not remain. Being aware of the necessary preconditions for success, and being 
adequately prepared to face challenges on the field must be a fundamental aspiration of 
the UN if it wants to escape the current spiral of failure in the countries of deployment. 
 
Also, the implications of low credibility in peacekeeping operations must not be 
underestimated. When the population loses faith ability of peacekeepers to fulfill their 
mandate or to protect civilians, local dissatisfaction is commonly the result. At low 
levels, dissatisfaction does not pose a danger to the operation and can be considered as 
normal. This is because the deployment of a peacekeeping operation generates high 
expectations among the local population, which often cannot be met. Yet, at its worst, 
growing dissatisfaction can lead to active opposition and a loss of legitimacy. 
Peacekeeping operations, however, rely on legitimacy and support from the local civilian 
population, to effectively carry out their mandate and initiate a peace process (Holt et 
al. 2009: 3).  
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UNMISS has not yet directly experienced the impact dissatisfaction can have. 
MONUSCO, however, has already encountered the negative impact local dissatisfaction 
entails. In 2014, the operation was targeted by armed civilians, who were dissatisfied 
with the peacekeeper’s efforts to protect civilians (Vermeij and Kjeksrud 2017: 234). In 
circumstances in which the local population is dissatisfied with the peacekeepers to the 
extent that violence erupts and the withdrawal of the operation is stridently demanded, 
a successful implementation of the mandate is practically impossible. 
Murphy concludes similarly that military credibility is critical to the success of an 
operation. Without sufficient equipment, numbers, and commitment, the peacekeeping 
operation reduces the likeliness for a successful implementation of its mandate (Murphy 
2016: 224). Also, Hultman et al. hold that the success of a peacekeeping operation 
“depends upon the credibility of the {…} commitment to the conflict” (Hultman et al. 
2014: 742). Without sufficient credibility, gained through high commitment and a strong 
stance, the creation of peace and reduction of tension is a difficult task to undertake. 
Moreover, the Capstone Doctrine warns peacekeepers that operations with low 
credibility will be “marginalized and ineffective” (UN 2008: 38), i.a. due to the impact 
low credibility has on the moral of the operation personnel, which further diminishes 
its effectiveness (ibid.). Besides, repeated failures and continuous low credibility 
jeopardize the legitimacy of UN to send out peacekeeping operations (Holt et al. 2009: 
4), and thus must be in the interest of the UN to be maintained. 
The implications of low credibility for UNMISS are that it must fear diminishing support 
from the local community, which can turn into violent conflict. Decreasing morale and 
growing ineffectiveness are also possible consequences. Credibility, in contrast to 
commitment, is not directly controllable by the UNSC, and thus more difficult to 
influence. Yet, appropriate clarification of the operation, its responsibilities, and 
limitations, to the international and local community, as well as high commitment can 
reduce unrealistically high expectations, which could contribute to a better 
understanding of the operation and moderate anger when peacekeeping activities fall 
short (Nadin et al. 2014: 104). 
MONUSCO does not currently have to fear for the negative implications low 
commitments entails because due to its presented strong stance, including high 
commitment and strong equipment, MONUSCO enjoys rather high credibility. High 
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credibility per se does not implicate tangible positive results, but it creates the 
foundation on which a successful operation must be built.  
Based on the results of the analysis and the implications of the findings, it can be 
concluded that UNMISS does not have the necessary preconditions for a successful 
implementation of its mandate. Therefore, UNMISS has negative prospects for a 
successful fulfillment of its POC mandate, unless both commitment and credibility will 
improve significantly. In MONSUCO, necessary preconditions and thus a foundation for 
success are present. Thus, MONUSCO has positive prospects for a successful 
implementation of its POC mandate. 
Important to note is that while the UNSC and the operation itself can control certain 
preconditions that influence the efficacy and outcome of peacekeeping efforts, it is close 
to impossible for peacekeeping operations to have an effect on situational influences, 
such as the spread of diseases, environmental factors, and the often deeply rooted 
sources of conflict (BBC 2017: n.p.). As discussed above, both countries suffer from severe 
humanitarian situations, and while a foundation for military success might be present, 
civilian deprivation is extremely challenging to counteract.  
A peacekeeping operation can be pictured as an experiment. The goal of the experiment 
is to establish peace and to protect civilians, yet it is unknown which particular steps 
must be taken to reach that goal, as every peacekeeping operation is unique. Lessons 
learned from past experiences, however, have taught that some conditions need to be 
present for success to be possible and likely. Those preconditions must be treated as 
constants, which ought to be present at all times, to have the foundation to reach the 
goal. The findings of this thesis explored whether these constants are present or absent 
in UNMISS and MONSUCO. Besides, there are also variables, which cannot be 
influenced, and which potentially disrupt the path towards a successfully implemented 
mandate. Seeing that there will always be factors that cannot be controlled by the 
operation, it is essential to do the very best to ensure that those constants, which are 
influenceable, are maintained high at all times.  
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6. Conclusion 
In order to improve the prospects for success in peacekeeping operations, an 
understanding of factors and preconditions that pave the way for a successful 
implementation of peacekeeping mandates is essential. This thesis sought to contribute 
to the growth of this knowledge by investigating the question: “To what extent are the 
necessary preconditions for the successful implementation of the mandate for the 
‘Protection of Civilians’ present in the peacekeeping operations UNMISS in South Sudan, 
and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?”. On a cross-case-study 
comparison between UNMISS and MONUSCO, this thesis explored the presence or 
absence of two preconditions, essential for the success of peacekeeping, which were 
commitment and credibility. The analysis approached the investigation – in contrast to 
the common retrospective view, which is based on an outcome analysis – from a 
prospective view, based on the examination of the status quo.  
The realm of POC is extensive, and the tasks peacekeepers have to fulfill are complex. 
The literature review gave an overview of this complexity, by splitting POC into three 
distinct realms: Human Rights Protection, Humanitarian Protection, and Military 
Protection. The primary focus of this analysis lay on the military realm, which is 
mandated with the physical protection of civilians from violence. Secondarily, the 
analysis also looked at the humanitarian realm, in order to come to a consistent and 
most accurate conclusion on the prospect of success for both operations, based on the 
presence or absence of the two preconditions in the military realm, and the state of the 
humanitarian realm as a whole. These two realms were chosen to be the subject of 
analysis because they are most imperative in guaranteeing and protecting civilian 
integrity and wellbeing. While the enforcement of Human Rights is undoubtedly an 
indispensable component of creating a peaceful and secure environment, providing 
protection from violence and deprivation are arguably steps that must be taken before 
any civilian can defend their legal rights. Thus, the military and humanitarian realms 
are the first steps in the implementation of the POC mandate. 
The evaluation of the findings suggested that UNMISS has low commitment and low 
credibility in its military realm, and that MONUSCO has high commitment and rather 
high credibility. As elaborated in the discussion, this implies that UNMISS does not have 
the required preconditions, and thus lacks the foundation on which to build a successful 
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peacekeeping operation. As a consequence, UNMISS has negative prospects for the 
effective fulfillment of its mandate. In contrast, the findings imply that MONUSCO does 
have the necessary preconditions, and therefore positive prospects for a successful 
implementation. The findings of this analysis thus confirm both, H1 and H2. 
The metaphor of a peacekeeping operation as an experiment, which aims to protect 
civilians, and in which both constants and variables are involved, illustrated that the 
analyzed preconditions only comprise a part of the whole picture. They are necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for success in peacekeeping operations. Therefore, this 
thesis does not seek to conclusively answer whether UNMISS and MONSUCO will 
succeed or fail, but rather whether they encompass the necessary foundation to build 
upon.  
The outcome of the analysis must be understood, taking some limitations into account. 
The realities of peacekeeping operations move rapidly, and thus the findings merely 
reflect the status quo. Credibility and commitment fluctuate steadily; therefore, the 
findings might not apply anymore before long. Nevertheless, analyses of current 
conditions are imperative, if the state of peacekeeping operations is to be understood 
and improved. Furthermore, due to the limited number of analyzed preconditions and 
corresponding indicators, the findings might not be as comprehensive as desired. This 
thesis aimed to serve as a pilot investigation, which provides the foundation for more 
complex and larger-scale studies in the future. Through the analysis, this thesis 
presented a replicable method with which to measure and evaluate the presence of 
preconditions, derived from the Evaluation Framework by Diehl and Druckman (2010). 
In order to gain a fundamental understanding of the status quo in peacekeeping 
operations for improvement strategies, future research must continue to focus on 
required preconditions. Expanded studies, incorporating an increased number of 
preconditions and indicators will most likely provide even more substantial results. 
Considering the announced budget cuts for UN peacekeeping operations (Besheer 2017: 
n.p.), an awareness of how to create the most optimal conditions for success with 
available means is vital. Since the unmanageable variables already impose enormous 
obstacles to the success of peacekeeping operations, this thesis conclusively urges the 
international community and the UNSC to take action by committing themselves to 
maintain and improve the influenceable ‘constants’ investigated in this thesis.  
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